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 The purpose of this study was to provide quantitative evidence linking food aid 
delivery mode and its correlation with food production in the recipient nation. Debate 
over the best way to provide food aid to developing countries inspired this study. The 
three delivery modes used for this study were direct transfer, locally purchase, and 
triangular purchase. Food aid data was available from The World Food Programme and 
food production indices were available from The World Bank. Correlations between the 
independent variable (food aid quantity by delivery mode) and dependent variable (food 
production index) were examined using the coefficient of determination, which is the 
Pearson correlation coefficient squared.  For direct transfer food aid (aid originating from 
the donor country), statistically significant negative correlations were found for 17 of the 
42 trials. For locally procured food aid (aid originating in recipient country), statistically 
significant positive correlations were found for 28 of the 42 trials. For triangular purchase 
(aid originating in a third country), statistically significant negative correlations were 
found for 8 of the 42 trials, while statistically significant positive correlations were found 
for 6 of the 42 trials. The conclusion of the study was that direct transfer food aid 
generally has a negative correlation with food production, locally procured food aid has a 
positive correlation with food production, and triangular purchase has no clear correlation 
with food production. Locally purchased food aid is recommended as the optimal form of 
food aid in order to ensure food security. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction of Topic 
Approximately one in eight individuals throughout the world (a total of 870 
million people) suffers from chronic food insecurity (USAID 2014). Chronic food 
insecurity is defined as the state of food insecurity that arises and endures as a result of 
long term not easily changed conditions (USAID 2014). Without assistance from external 
sources, these people face the negative consequences of hunger and risk the chance of 
dying from starvation. Populations that have resources to ensure food security for its 
members often feel a moral obligation to provide assistance to those in need.  
While few argue that food aid should be reduced to nothing, debate exists about 
which forms are most effective. Inefficiencies in the transfer and distribution of food aid 
lead to wasted time and money. The best method of delivery has not been clearly defined 
by past research. Delivery modes include direct transfer, local purchase, and triangular 
purchase. Direct transfer is the delivery of commodities originating from the donor 
country to the recipient, local purchase is food aid that is purchased in the recipient 
nation’s food surplus areas and transferred to locations with food deficits, and triangular 
purchase is food aid purchased from a country that is neither the donor nor the recipient 
(Nugusse 2013).  
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The “disincentive effect,” which claims that international food aid creates a 
disincentive for local production has been studied with varying results. Some have found 
that food aid has led to an increase in food production (Isenman and Singer 1977; 
Bezunah et al. 2003; Gelan 2007). Others have found no significant effect of food aid on 
food production (Abdulai et al. 2005). Different studies have found a link between food 
aid and decreases in production (Motaal 2011; (Sharaunga and Wale 2013). 
The intention of this study is to analyze data of delivery modes of food aid and 
understand their effects on measures of food security. Little empirical evidence exists 
regarding the effect of delivery mode on food production. Schlossman et al. conducted a 
study that identified various improvements related to delivery of Public Law 480 Title II 
food aid from the United States (Schlossman et al. 2011). This study does not look at 
methods of delivery other than direct transfer. The research team of Christopher B. 
Barrett has conducted numerous studies related to local and regional procurement 
(Barrett et al. 2013). Their studies have looked at the cost savings and efficiency 
improvements of local and regional procurement, analyzed price effects of local and 
regional procurement on local markets, measured recipient satisfaction with locally and 
regionally procured food in comparison to food originating from donor countries, 
analyzed quality and safety of local and regional procured food, and looked at nutritional 
impacts of local and regional procured food (Barrett et al. 2013). An omission from these 
studies is the relationship between local and regional procured food and measures of food 
security. 
 Analyzing the effects of delivery mode on outcomes in the recipient nations 
would provide useful insight to government officials and organization leaders responsible 
for writing laws or allocating funds related to food aid. If a definitive link exists between 
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a delivery mode and increased food security and/or poverty reduction, then this 
information could guide decision makers to the best way of providing food aid.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Overview of Types of Food Aid 
Three forms of food aid are program food aid, project food aid (developmental 
food aid), and emergency food aid (Nugusse 2011). Any aid that requires the 
procurement of goods and/or services from the donor country is known as “tied aid.” 
Food aid ‘in kind’ refers to raw or processed agricultural products which are donated to a 
recipient government or non-governmental organization (Kneteman 2009).   
Program food aid originates from crops grown in the donor country and given to 
the recipient nation so that commodities can be sold on the open market to produce 
revenue for the recipient nation government (Nugusse 2011). Program food aid can 
support balance of payments when some of the foreign exchange that would have been 
spent on food imports is saved and allocated to other budgetary items (Awokuse 2011). 
Funds gained from the sale of program food aid are often used toward economic 
development. Because the food aid is sold on the open market, it usually does not end up 
in the hands of the neediest individuals.  
Project food aid targets specific beneficiary groups who participated in activities 
aimed at triggering economic growth, increasing food security, or other developmental 
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programs in the recipient nations (Nugusse 2011). Beneficiary groups include the 
recipient nation’s government, multilateral development agencies, or non-governmental 
organizations. The World Food Programme is the primary agency responsible for 
administering multilateral food aid (Awokuse 2011). 
 Emergency food aid is directed toward recipients who have experienced an 
unanticipated emergency situation, such as war or a natural disaster (Nugusse 2011). 
Emergency food aid is not subject to as much controversy as other forms of food aid 
because it is usually seen as necessary to relieve suffering in the wake of disaster.  
The most significant food aid program operated by the United States Government 
is Public Law 480 (PL-480). PL-480 was signed into law as the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Aid of 1954 (Kneteman 2009). Title I of PL-480 (Economic 
Assistance and Food Security) governs long-term, low-interest loans to developing 
nations to purchase United States produced food commodities (Kneteman 2009). Title I is 
administered by the USDA, but currently receives no funding. Title II of PL-480 
(Emergency and Private Assistance Programs), also known as “Food for Peace,” governs 
“in-kind” food donations for emergency relief or US commodities to be sold on the open 
market, known as monetization (Kneteman 2009). In 2009, Title II cost the United States 
$2.6 billion and provided 2.4 million metric tons of commodities. (Food Aid and Security 
Coalition) Food Aid reform in the 2014 United States budget discontinued the 
monetization aspect of Title II. (USAID) Funds previously reserved for Title II of PL-480 
have been shifted to International Disaster Assistance ($1.1 billion for 2014), The 
Community Development and Resilience Fund ($330 million for 2014), and a newly 
created Emergency Food Assistance Contingency Fund ($75 million for 2014) (USAID).  
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Other food aid programs include Food for Progress, The McGovern-Dole 
International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, and Section 416(b) of the 
Agricultural Act of 1949. The Food for Progress Program was authorized by the Food for 
Progress Act of 1985 (USA FSDA). The Food for Progress Act aims to support local 
agriculture in developing countries by selling donated commodities in the local market 
and using the proceeds to enhance domestic agricultural infrastructure (USA FSDA). The 
McGovern–Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program donates 
US agricultural products to aid children in low-income nations (USA FSDA). Section 
416(b) oversees donations of surplus commodities acquired by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) (USA FSDA).  The Commodity Credit Corporation is a government 
owned entity created to stabilize and support farm incomes (USA FSA). The CCC offers 
loans to farmers at low rates. Repayments of the loans can be in cash or in the form of 
commodities; however, most repayments are made in cash.  
Delivery Modes of Food Aid 
  According to the World Food Programme, the most common delivery mode of 
food aid, which accounted for 64.4% of all food aid worldwide in 2012, is direct transfer 
(WFP). Direct transfer or direct delivery occurs when commodities are purchased in the 
donor country and then delivered to the recipient nation (Nugusse 2013). While direct 
transfer is still the most prevalent delivery mode of food aid worldwide, the percentage of 
food aid delivered by this method has decreased in the 25 years data has been available 
from the World Food Programme regarding quantities delivered. In 1988, direct transfer 
of food aid accounted for 90.6% of food aid. The percentage of food aid delivered 
worldwide via direct transfer was as 83.4% in 2002, but the percentage of total food aid 
that was donated through direct transfer steadily declined after 2002. This percentage 
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reached a low in 2011, when 50.5% of worldwide food aid was donated through transfer 
(WFP). Total food aid provided has generally declined. The peak amount provided was 
16,908,492.1 actual tons in 1993, while the least provided was 4,690,726.4 actual tons in 
2011 (WFP). 
 Another method of food aid is to provide locally procured commodities rather 
than commodities originating from the donor country. This is known as local and regional 
procurement. Locally procuring crops was found to reduce delivery time of commodities 
by 14 weeks (Lentz et al. 2013). Cost effectiveness of local procurement varied by 
commodity, but was generally more cost effective for grains, while not always cost 
effective for processed commodities (Lentz et al. 2013). Local procurement did not have 
a statistically significant relationship with local price levels or food price volatility (Garg 
et al. 2013). Risks associated with local and regional procurement include insufficient 
infrastructure, inadequate local supplies, quality considerations, funding delays, and legal 
issues (Hanrahan 2009). 
 Food aid can also be delivered through a triangular purchase, in which the 
commodities donated are purchased in a country other than the donor or recipient country 
(Nugusse 2013). This third nation is often another developing nation, boosting the 
agricultural sector in this country (Shah 2007). 
 An innovative way to handle food aid is by shifting from donating commodities to 
cash transfers. Cash transfer provides needy individuals with currency in order to make 
their own food purchases (Kebede 2006).  Large scale cash transfers were found to have 
an effect on markets, often leading to higher food prices (Kebede 2006). Studies found 
that a benefit of cash transfers is that recipients of cash were more likely to have diverse 
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diets in comparison to recipients of food aid and net household welfare increased for cash 
recipients (Hidrobo et al. 2012; Gelan 2006). 
The European Union has shifted most of its donated food aid to local purchase or 
triangular purchase, while the United States still predominantly uses direct transfer to 
provide aid (WFP). In 2012, 93.9% of food aid donated by the United States was direct 
transfer, 4.8% was procured through local purchase, and 1.3% was procured through 
triangular purchase (WFP). Figures for the European Community show that only 1% of 
food aid was donated through direct transfer, 54.4% was procured through local 
purchase, and 44.6% was procured through triangular purchase. (WFP) These figures do 
not take cash transfers into consideration. 
Criticism of United States Food Aid Policy 
 Inefficiencies in traditional United States food aid processes have called into 
question whether the traditional donation of commodities to developing nations serves as 
the best method of providing food aid. As of 2009, more than 99% of all food aid donated 
by the United States was procured by domestic producers (Kneteman 2009). The original 
intention of Title I and Title II of Public Law 480 (PL-480), also known as the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, was to promote American 
agricultural interests (Kneteman 2009). In the wake of price supports initiated during the 
Great Depression, American agricultural producers had significant surpluses which could 
not be sold on the open market. PL-480 allowed for many of these commodities to be 
shipped to Europe or developing countries. When there were no longer surpluses the US 
Government began to purchase commodities through the domestic market, particularly 
from large agribusinesses (Kneteman 2009). Government food aid contracts were 
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awarded on a bid basis to eligible agribusinesses. Through the bid system, the US 
Government paid up to 70% more for corn than open market prices and an average of 
11% more for all commodities (Kneteman 2009). A provision in the 1985 Farm Bill 
requires 75 percent of non-emergency food aid from the US Government to be fortified, 
bagged or processed (Barrett and Lentz 2009). These activities add significant costs, 
pricing out small farmers of winning contracts in favor of large agribusiness (Barrett and 
Lentz 2009). Because of this system of procuring US Commodities, many criticize 
current policy as a subsidy for large agribusiness. 
According to a policy known as Agricultural Cargo Preference (ACP), 75% of all 
agricultural aid shipments must be delivered on privately owned, American registered 
vessels. (Bageant et al. 2010) In order to be eligible under ACP, a vessel must be 
registered with the United States for at least three years. (Bageant et al. 2010) A 2012 
provision in bill number H.R. 4348 reduced the required amount of Government 
generated cargo (cargo furnished, procured, or financed by the US Government) shipped 
on American registered vessels to 50% (Bethel). However, section 318 of the Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 returned the required amount of 
Government generated cargo shipped on private US flagged vessels back to 75% (US 
AID). About 40% of these American registered vessels belong to American owned 
companies that are subsidiaries of foreign companies. (Bageant et al. 2010) The AP 
Moller-Maersk Group, headquartered in Denmark, owns 21 of the 144 vessels in the US 
ACP fleet. (Bageant et al. 2010) Contracts are awarded to vessels on a priority bid system 
that is divided into three priority levels. (Bageant et al. 2010) Priority 1 bids come from 
shipments that use only US-flagged vessels. If P1 bids are made, they take precedence 
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over Priority 2 and Priority 3 bids. (Bageant et al. 2010) Priority 2 bids involve both US-
flagged and foreign-flagged vessels, while Priority 3 bids involve strictly foreign-flagged 
vessels. (Bageant et al. 2010) If no Priority 1 bids are made for a given shipment, Priority 
2 bidders are chosen based upon price competition. (Bageant et al. 2010) If no Priority 1 
or Priority 2 bids are made, then Priority 3 bids are considered. (Bageant et al. 2010) 
Critics of Agricultural Cargo Preference claim it adds unnecessary costs to the delivery of 
commodities and serves as a subsidy to a fledgling American shipping industry. 
Monetization is the selling of donated food into overseas markets by private 
voluntary organizations, accounting for sixty percent of American non-emergency food 
aid in as of 2009. Monetization has been found to be an ineffective and wasteful form of 
food aid. (Barrett and Lentz 2009) Critics argue monetization interferes with domestic 
markets by forcing local farmers to sell commodities at low prices or to reduce 
production. (Motaal 2011) Most monetization is fueled by United States based Non-
Governmental Organizations. (Motaal 2011) Food Aid reform in the 2014 United States 
budget discontinued the monetization aspect of PL-480 Title II. (USAID) 
Effect on Recipient Nation’s Markets 
Studies analyzing the effect of food aid on local production through 
“disincentive” effects have been inconclusive. An early study into food aid to India 
concluded detrimental price effects from food aid were offset by an increase in 
subsidized food distribution and demand increases stemming from higher incomes 
(Isenman and Singer 1977).  A simulation using a computable general equilibrium 
modeling technique and using data from Ethiopia found that the removal of food aid 
would increase food prices and subsequently stimulate food production (Gelan 2007). A 
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study analyzing a statistical link between food aid shipments and prices in three markets 
located in Ethiopia between 1996-2006 found a link between previous year food aid 
shipments and a reduction of prices in both consumer and producer markets (Tadesse and 
Shivley 2009). It was found that food aid up to 10% of domestic production did not 
produce negative market effects, but food aid more than that would trigger disruption in 
local markets. Conditioning food aid related to quantities of local market production was 
recommended as a solution to navigate around disincentive effects (Tadesse and Shivley 
2009). A study using household-level data, controlling possible confounding variables, 
found food aid produces no disincentive effect for production in rural Ethiopia (Abdulai 
et al. 2005). Another study analyzing the Tunisian economy from 1960-1992 found food 
aid did not affect domestic production or commercial imports, but rather positive effects 
gained from the food aid in conjunction with government policies aimed at preventing 
disincentive effects (Bezunah et al. 2003). Food aid was found to lead to cheaper food 
prices, creating more buying power for consumers, leading to an increase in food 
production (Bezunah et al. 2003). A study analyzing food consumption in Northern 
Uganda found that food aid avoided distress destocking of low value assets for male 
headed households, meaning households were able to maintain property through lower 
food expenditures (Hamidu et al. 2013). A study that differentiated between targeted and 
program (project) food aid, found effects on recipient country food production were 
statistically significant for program aid, but not for targeted aid (Lowder et al. 2004). 
Targeted food aid was intended exclusively for free distribution to food insecure 
individuals. When local markets are influenced through food aid, domestic food security 
is jeopardized as local production decreases from farmers who cannot compete with low 
price imports (Motaal 2011). Sharaunga and Wale found food aid, in conjunction with 
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price controls, led to a decrease in food production in Malawi (Sharaunga and Wale 
2013). A study by Nunn and Qian found that an increase in food aid from the United 
States leads to an increase in the duration of civil conflict, but no robust effect on 
intrastate conflicts (Nunn and Qian 2014). 
Effect on Donor Nation 
Various theories exist as to why America provides foreign aid. Various types of 
aid, including food aid, were provided in the wake of World War II to help reconstruction 
in affected nations. Early theories of donor motives were that the donor nation hoped to 
gain political favor with the recipient nation, the donor nation hoped to gain long run 
economic benefit from opening trade with the recipient nation, or for altruistic motives 
intending to have a favorable impact on needy individuals in the recipient nation (Dudley 
and Montmarquette 1976). Dudley and Montmarquette found that the likelihood of a 
donor to give aid to a recipient nation increased as per capita incomes in recipient nations 
decreased.  
The goals for foreign aid as outlined by the United States Agency for 
International Development were: to create markets for the United States by reducing 
poverty and increasing production in developing countries, and to diminish the threat of 
communism by helping countries prosper under capitalism (Bandyopadhyay and 
Vermann 2013). Colonial relationships and current political alliances were found to be a 
significant factor in the allocation of foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Preference 
was found to be given to nations within close geographical proximity (Neumayer 2005). 
Aid originating from the United States was found to be more likely to serve donor 
interests rather than recipient need in comparison to food aid originating from Europe 
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(Neumayer 2005). A relationship between commodity producer interests and aid 
provided by the United States was also found (Diven 2001). Foreign aid shipments 
increased when higher government stocks were accumulated (Diven 2001). 
 An early study on the dispersion of American farm surpluses to developing 
nations theorizes that the selling of all available commodities on the world market would 
result in a price lower than actual market price when accounting for donated commodities 
under PL 480 (Schultz 1960). Schultz estimates the marginal revenue on the open market 
from the 27% of commodities donated under PL 480 would have been negative rather 
than positive (Schultz 1960). Schultz estimates the value of US donated commodities to 
recipient nations as half the cost of the commodities to the United States, while recipient 
nations end up paying 10-15 cents on the dollar to obtain these commodities (Schultz 
1960). This ratio allows for a net benefit to recipient nations.  
About the Participant Countries 
 Bangladesh has a population of 156 million people and a GDP of $130 billion in 
2013 (The World Bank 2014). Improvements in irrigation have allowed for greater crop 
production, particularly of rice, a staple food (The World Bank 2014). About 47 million 
Bangladesh citizens remain in poverty (The World Bank 2014). A significant contributor 
to poverty in Bangladesh is  high population density which has put a strain on social 
services. Infrastructure is underdeveloped and cannot serve the entire population (The 
World Bank 2014). 
 Ethiopia has a population of 94 million and a GDP of $47 billion in 2013 (The 
World Bank 2014). Per capita income in Ethiopia is $470 annually, among the lowest in 
the entire world (The World Bank 2014). The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
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Democratic Front has had power in Ethiopia since 1991 and has shifted the country away 
from highly centralized government into a more democratic system (The World Bank 
2014). Malaria and HIV have been significant challenges for the Ethiopian population, as 
well as poor access to safe drinking water (The World Bank 2014). 
 Kenya has a population of 44 million and a GDP of $44 billion in 2013 (The 
World Bank 2014). Kenya achieved lower middle income status in 2012, but issues of 
poverty, low investment, and low productivity continue (The World Bank 2014). 
Improvements in infrastructure, including electricity and safe water access have 
improved the standard of living for millions of Kenyans (The World Bank 2014). 
 Pakistan has a population of 182 million and a GDP of $237 billion in 2013 (The 
World Bank 2014). Low spending on health and education (2% of total GDP) have 
stunted development (The World Bank 2014). Pakistan’s involvement in Middle East 
conflict, particularly as a base location for the Taliban and other terrorist groups has had a 
widespread effect on the welfare of its civilian population.  
 Somalia has a population of 10 million and recent GDP data is not available (The 
World Bank 2014). Somalia has been fighting an ongoing civil war, which has hampered 
its ability to respond to natural disasters or other disruptions in the food supply (The 
World Bank 2014). In 2012, a new government was formed with the election of President 
Hassan Sheikh (The World Bank 2014). Somalia’s politicians and citizens have been 
unable to reach consensus on a national vision and attempts to establish peace have failed 
(The World Bank 2014). 
 Sudan has a population of 38 million and a GDP of $67 billion in 2013 (The 
World Bank 2014). In 2011, the Southern states of Sudan seceded, forming the Republic 
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of South Sudan (The World Bank 2014). The secession of South Sudan led to economic 
shocks, particularly a loss of oil revenue (The World Bank 2014). Rural populations face 
higher poverty rates than urban populations (The World Bank 2014). Corruption and civil 
conflict have hindered progress in Sudan. 
 Yemen has a population of 24 million and a GDP of $36 billion in 2013 (The 
World Bank 2014). Scarce water resources are a major contributing factor to poverty, as 
Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab world (The World Bank 2014). 
Schistosomiasis, a disease stemming from a parasitic worm found in contaminated water, 
has affected millions of Bangladesh citizens, but efforts to treat infected patients have 
reduced the magnitude of its devastation (The World Bank 2014). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
Seven countries have been selected for analysis in the study: Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, and Bangladesh. These countries were selected 
because they are among the largest recipients of food aid, received all three delivery 
modes of food aid, and represent varying regions of the world (Africa and Asia). Data are 
available for all of these countries and represents aid donated or food produced 
throughout the entire country. These seven countries received 24.08% of all food aid 
from 1990-2008. Total food aid from 1990-2008 was 189,398,283 actual tons. From 
1990-2008 across all nations, 80.28% of food aid was direct transfer, 6.79% was locally 
procured, and 12.94% was triangular purchase. 
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Variables 
The independent variable in the study is delivery mode of food aid. Delivery mode is 
divided into three categories: direct transfer, local purchase, and triangular purchase. This 
data are available through The World Food Programme’s Food Aid Information System. 
The data are available from 1988-2012 and is measured in actual tons.  
The primary dependent variable is food production, measured through the food 
production index. Food production index covers food crops that are considered edible and 
that contain nutrients (The World Bank). Crops used for uses other than consumptions are 
excluded. Coffee and tea are excluded as well because they contain no nutritional value. 
The index has a base number of 100 and the base year is the average of production 
between the years 2004-2006. The index number for each particular year represents a 
percentage as a comparison to the index from the base years. For example, an index of 70 
0
5
10
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20
25
30
Ethiopia Bangladesh Sudan Pakistan Kenya Somalia Yemen Total of
these 7
countries
Figure 1: Percent of Total Food Aid from 1990-2008
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in 1999 indicates that food production in 1999 in this country was 70% of the average 
food production in the years 2004-2006. This data are available through The World Bank 
for all seven participating countries from 1993-2012.  
Instrumentation and Materials 
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS software from IBM. Pearson coefficients of 
correlation were used to explore relationships between food delivery modes and the food 
production index. The Coefficient of Determination or R^2 was used to evaluate the 
percentage of variation explained by the independent variable. The coefficient of 
determination was selected because it is a tool that evaluates explained variance for 
bivariate models. Various time period lags were used to explore correlations between 
food aid and the food prediction index. A time lag matches variables that took place in 
separate years. Because donated food aid will not have an immediate impact on food 
production, a reactionary period of at least three years is logical in order to explore a 
meaningful relationship between the variables. Time lags will be used for each number of 
years between 3 and 8 years after the food aid was donated. For example, for food aid 
donated in 1995, food production in the years from 1998-2003 will be used as the 
dependent variable. Time lags were used because the nature of the variables indicates a 
period of adjustment prior to leading to a meaningful relationship. Each correlation 
coefficient represents the relationship between the independent and dependent variable 
over a time period of numerous years. For example, using a three year lag, food aid 
donated in 1990-2008 was correlated with the food production indices from 1993-2011. 
An alpha level of .05 was used to indicate a significant correlation, with an alpha level of 
.01 used to indicate a strong correlation. 
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 The statistical analysis determined whether increases or decreases in the amount 
of food aid donated via each delivery mode correlate with increased or decreased food 
production within the recipient country. The goal was to determine which delivery mode 
of food aid leads to greater food security within the recipient nation and how long it will 
take to show a change in food production related to the food aid donated. 
Hypothesis 
1. Null: Direct transfer food aid will not show a relevant number of statistically significant 
correlations with food production. 
Alternative: Direct transfer food aid will show a relevant number of statistically 
significant correlations with food production in the same direction (either negative or 
positive).  
2. Null: Locally procured food aid will not show a relevant number of statistically 
significant correlations with food production. 
Alternative: Locally procured food aid will not show a relevant number of statistically 
significant correlations with food production in the same direction (either negative or 
positive). 
3. Null: Triangular purchase food aid will not show a relevant number of statistically 
significant correlations with food production. 
Alternative: Locally procured food aid will show a relevant number of statistically 
significant correlations with food production in the same direction (either negative or 
positive) 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
Direct Transfer 
The time lags correspond with the following years used in the analysis: 
3 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1990-2008 Direct Transfer Food Aid 
Received 
4 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1989-2007 Direct Transfer Food Aid 
Received 
5 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2006 Direct Transfer Food Aid 
Received 
6 Year Lag- 1994-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2005 Direct Transfer Food Aid 
Received 
7 Year Lag- 1995-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2004 Direct Transfer Food Aid 
Received 
8 Year Lag- 1996-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2003 Direct Transfer Food Aid 
Received 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient is listed for each country for each time lag 
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Table 1: Direct Transfer Correlations 
   Ethiopia Kenya Sudan Somalia Bangladesh Yemen Pakistan 
3y 
lag 
.052 .100 -.044 .154 -.696** -.165 -.543* 
4y 
lag 
.036 .162 -.121 -.110 -.695** -.089 -.580** 
5y 
lag 
.038 .154 -.426 -.325 -.715** -.026 -.589** 
6y 
lag 
.027 .055 -.671** -.660** -.673** .115 -.560* 
7y 
lag 
-.044 .021 -.705** -.623** -.614** .269 -.484* 
8y 
lag 
.078 -.044 -.724** -.665** -.516* .216 -.469 
 
     * Indicates significance at .05 alpha level 
    ** Indicates significance at .01 alpha level 
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Locally Procured 
The time lags correspond with the following years used in the analysis: 
3 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1990-2008 Locally Purchased Food Aid 
Received 
4 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1989-2007 Locally Purchased Food Aid 
Received 
5 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2006 Locally Purchased Food Aid 
Received 
6 Year Lag- 1994-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2005 Locally Purchased Food Aid 
Received 
7 Year Lag- 1995-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2004 Locally Purchased Food Aid 
Received 
8 Year Lag- 1996-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2003 Locally Purchased Food Aid 
Received 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient is listed for each country for each time lag. 
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Table 2: Locally Procured Correlations 
 Ethiopia Kenya Sudan Somalia Bangladesh Yemen Pakistan 
3y 
lag 
.464* .747** .409 .663** .642** .729** .667** 
4y 
lag 
.661** .777** .370 .694** .578** .678** .713** 
5y 
lag 
.844** .735** .447 .346 .436 .614** .814** 
6y 
lag 
.872** .808** .351 -.055 .521* .565* .795** 
7y 
lag 
.835** .777** .306 -.162 .506* .336 .762** 
8y 
lag 
.870** .735** .267 -.183 .267 -.110 .696** 
 
     * Indicates significance at .05 alpha level 
    ** Indicates significance at .01 alpha level 
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Triangular Purchase 
The time lags correspond with the following years used in the analysis: 
3 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1990-2008 Triangular Purchase Food 
Aid Received 
4 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1989-2007 Triangular Purchase Food 
Aid Received 
5 Year Lag- 1993-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2006 Triangular Purchase Food 
Aid Received 
6 Year Lag- 1994-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2005 Triangular Purchase Food 
Aid Received 
7 Year Lag- 1995-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2004 Triangular Purchase Food 
Aid Received 
8 Year Lag- 1996-2011 Food Production Index, 1988-2003 Triangular Purchase Food 
Aid Received 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient is listed for each country for each time lag. 
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Table 3: Triangular Purchase Correlations 
 Ethiopia Kenya Sudan Somalia Bangladesh Yemen Pakistan 
3 y 
lag 
.108 .041 .130 .205 -.347 .596** -.411 
4 y 
lag 
.063 .038 .116 -.081 -.446 .679** -.552* 
5 y 
lag 
.056 .264 -.015 -.085 -.534* .566* -.584** 
6 y 
lag 
.088 .210 -.516* -.325 -.445 .518* -.534* 
7 y 
lag 
.181 .162 -.469 -.435 -.500* .629** -.507* 
8 y 
lag 
.416 .244 -.454 -.454 -.422 .530* -.530* 
 
     * Indicates significance at .05 alpha level 
    ** Indicates significance at .01 alpha level 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Analysis of the Data 
Direct Transfer 
  For Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen, no statistically significant correlations arise 
when analyzing the correlation between direct transfer food aid and domestic food 
production using the food production index. For Sudan and Somalia, no statistically 
significant correlation appears when using a 3, 4, or 5 year lag. However, when using a 6, 
7, or 8 year lag, there is a negative correlation significant at the .01 alpha level for both 
Sudan and Somalia. This indicates that after a period of 6 to 8 years, food production and 
directly transferred food aid negatively correlate. The lag period may indicate that 
changes in domestic production take place over a gradual time period as domestic 
production decisions are not made immediately in response to the amount of directly 
transferred food aid. Also, agriculture has an inherent time lag from when a production 
decision is made to the point when the food has been processed into an edible form. For 
Bangladesh, there is a statistically significant negative correlation for each of the lag 
periods measured. The negative correlation is significant at the .01 level for a 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7 year lag and at the .05 level for the 8 year lag. For Pakistan, a 4 and 5 year lag 
27 
 
period indicate a negative correlation significant at the .01 level, and a negative 
correlation significant at the .05 level for 3, 6, and 7 year lag periods. 
Overall, each statistically significant correlation for direct transfer food aid was 
negative. This indicates that in these particular cases, an increase in directly transferred 
food aid led to a decrease in recipient country domestic food production after the given 
lag period or a decrease in directly transferred food aid led to an increase in recipient 
country domestic food production. 
Locally Procured 
For Kenya and Pakistan, each lag period indicates a positive correlation between 
locally procured food aid and domestic food production significant at the .01 alpha level. 
Ethiopia has a statistically significant positive correlation at each lag period, with a .05 
level significance with a 3 year lag and a .01 level of significance for all other lag periods 
tested. Somalia has a positive correlation significant at the .01 level with a 3 and 4 year 
lag, but no statistical significance is evident for any other lag periods. Bangladesh has a 
positive correlation at the .01 level for a 3 and a 4 year lag, and at the .05 level for a 6 and 
7 year lag. There is no significant correlation for the 5 and 8 year lags. Yemen has a 
positive correlation significant at the .01 level for 3, 4, and 5 year lags, as well as a 
significant positive correlation at the .05 level for a 6 year lag. No statistical significance 
is present for a 7 and 8 year lag. Sudan shows no statistically significant link for any of 
the lag periods tested.  
Because all statistically significant correlations for locally procured food aid and 
food production in the recipient country are positive, this seems to indicate that a 
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relationship exists where an increase in locally procured food aid leads to an increase in 
domestic food production and a decrease in the amount of locally procured food aid leads 
to a decrease in domestic food production.  
Triangular Purchase 
Ethiopia and Kenya showed no statistically significant correlations over any lag 
period measured between triangular purchased food aid and domestic food production. 
Sudan’s only statistically significant correlation was a negative correlation for a 6 year 
lag at the .05 alpha level. Bangladesh showed a statistically significant negative 
correlation at the .05 level for a 5 and 7 year lag period. Pakistan showed a statistically 
significant negative correlation for a 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 year lag. The 5 year lag significant 
at the .01 level, while the other lag periods were significant at the .05 level. In a reversal 
from trend, all lag periods for Yemen indicated a statistically significant positive 
correlation. The correlation was significant at the .01 level for 3, 4, and 7 year lags and 
significant at the .05 level for the 5, 6, and 8 year lags. Because there was no uniform 
direction of statistical significance and the amount of statistically significant correlations 
was lower than for the other methods of food aid, there is no distinct conclusion that can 
be drawn regarding the relationship between triangular purchased food aid and domestic 
food production in the recipient country of the food aid. 
Conclusions 
 For part 1 of the hypothesis, regarding direct transfer food aid, the null hypothesis 
was rejected and the alternative hypothesis was not rejected. There were a relevant 
number of statistically significant correlations, and they were all in the negative direction. 
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For part 2 of the hypothesis, regarding locally procured food aid, the null hypothesis was 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis was not rejected. There were a relevant number of 
statistically significant correlations, and they were all in the positive direction. For part 3 
of the hypothesis, regarding triangular purchase food aid, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis was rejected, as there were not a relevant number 
of statistically significant correlations. For triangular purchase, the few statistically 
significant results were in both positive and negative directions.  
 The results of this study suggest that criticism of direct transfer food aid has 
validity in regards to its negative consequences for domestic food production in the 
recipient country. Procuring food aid locally was found to have increased food 
production, indicating that local procurement is the delivery mode that best ensures food 
security for the recipient nation. The conclusions of this study can serve as evidence that 
locally procured food aid has a more desirable effect than direct transfer food aid, and 
thus future food aid policy should be designed in such a way that local procurement is 
favored over the direct transfer of commodities. Because the United States is the world’s 
largest food aid donor, particular interest should be given from United States’ policy 
makers regarding the benefits of locally procured food aid. The proverb “Give a man a 
fish, he eats for a day. Teach a man to fish, he eats for a lifetime” is applicable to direct 
transfer versus locally procured food aid.  
 Direct transfer is likely to continue as a method of food delivery; however, much 
of the benefit from direct transfer food aid is seen in the donor country rather than the 
recipient nation. Direct transfer food aid may be a necessity during times of emergencies, 
such as natural disaster or war when locally procured food aid is not a feasible option. 
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While direct transfer food aid may have a negative impact on domestic food production, 
the welfare of individuals in need is critically important. Independent food security for 
nations is an ideal goal, but the reality is that many nations are far away from having the 
means to achieve this lofty goal. Direct transfer food aid may be necessary to prevent 
widespread hunger as local agriculture strengthens its capacity to provide food to its 
nation’s citizens.  
 In order to support locally procured food aid, investing in agriculture in 
developing nations is crucial. Providing local farmers with the technology and knowledge 
necessary to be able to feed their nation’s people is a critical aspect in ensuring 
worldwide food security.  
 When looking at the various lag periods, the exact length of time that it takes for 
food aid to impact food production is not apparent. Each lag period had statistically 
significant results in at least some cases.  
 A limitation of this study is that it only looked at the relationship between two 
variables. If other variables, such as project and emergency food aid were used as an 
additional variable, perhaps the results would tell us more about the relationship between 
food aid delivery mode and recipient nation food security when the aid is presented as 
emergency or project aid. Future studies may also look at more countries or take into 
account the donor country.  
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